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November 1989 I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although the recent performance of the U.S.  macroeconomy is being hailed 
as "the longest modern peacetime expansions
n  failures of depository 
institutions have been closely linked to certain depressed productive sectors 
in the country.  The most stark examples can be found in  the depressed 
farm-belt and oil-producing regions.  Observations indicate that financial 
firms do not or cannot diversify against industry-specific risk when choosing 
their loan portfolios. Such behavior may be explained by extensive government 
regulation of the industry's  scale and scope or by technological costs of 
intermediating credit that encourage specialized lending by region or by 
industry. 
This paper does not attempt to formally explain why depository 
institutions engage in specialized lending; rather, it examines some 
implications of regional and sectoral banking in terms of macroeconomic 
perf~rmance.~  It considers the short-run implications of bank-capital 
immobility when banks produce real services in channeling the flow of funds 
into investments. We illustrate how regional banking conditions can affect the 
mix of aggregate investment and the level of future aggregate output in the 
absence of macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Given the current deregulatory trend in structural policy changes, the 
nature of the financial services industries has come under intense scrutiny. 
Recent banking literature has formalized how financial contracts are related 
to imperfect information. A recurring theme has been that when information is 
costly, the quantity and nature of external finance has allocative consequences. Diamond  (1984)  demonstrates how financial intermediaries 
(hereafter referred to as banks) can improve the efficiency of capital markets 
by diversifying and thus minimizing information  costs; however, perfect 
diversification makes bank capital and the dispersion of bank asset returns 
irrelevant to bank portfolio choice. 
These strong informational assumptions allow the intermediation process to 
work more smoothly than we observe. If these conditions are not met, bank 
capital and the risk of bank assets affect bank profitability. Bernanke and 
Gertler  (1987)  show how the inability to eliminate variability in portfolio 
returns implies that "health" of a'bank's balance sheet can affect the flow of 
funds to risky bank investments. In their model, depositors cannot observe the 
ex-post returns on  bank projects at any cost and bank capital must absorb 
random asset returns; insufficient bank capital may constrain banks from 
investing in risky but profitable investments. In a similar framework, Samolyk 
(1989)  examines how the interest-rate risk associated with the maturity 
transformation in bank portfolios affects bank asset management. 
This paper will analyze the implications of imperfect information for 
investment in a decentralized banking ~ystern.~  We present an intertemporal 
model of banking similar to that of Bernanke and Gertler. Bankers possess a 
specialized technology that allows them to channel resources to investment 
projects that would not be funded in direct credit markets. They also have 
information about their portfolio returns. Unlike Bernanke and Gertler  , this 
analysis attempts to incorporate the notion that there is more than one 
productive sector in the economy. We assume that in the short run, bank 3 
technology is market-specific and immobile. Local banking conditions, as well 
as local investment opportunities, affect both the flow of funds to productive 
projects in a given "market" and the level of future output. 
We demonstrate how distributional imbalances in banking conditions across 
productive sectors affect the aggregate allocation of credit. Local bank 
capital, relative to the risk of local investments, affects the ability of 
"banking marketsn to use their technology to conduct specialized lending. 
Ailing banking industries or regions can become capital-constrained  in their 
ability to attract external finance to fund even profitable local investments. 
Optimally, an  interregional flow of funds should occur to equate the marginal 
products of capital across regions. However, when banks produce real services 
in conducting intermediation, regional banking conditions can affect the costs 
of external finance and drive a wedge between returns across productive 
sectors that would not occur in a world of perfect information. These results 
are contrasted with regional  &posit  imbalances to underscore the significance 
of bank-capital adequacy in facilitating specialized bank finance. 
Section I1 presents the basic moqel of regional banking and alternative 
market equilibria. Sections I11 and IV show how regional imbalances in  &posit 
flows and in bank-capital adequacy differ in their potential effect on bank 
portfolio choices. Section I11 examines the effects of regional imbalances in 
the flow of funds to banks when all regions have identically-distributed 
production possibilities. Section IV  illustrates how productivity shocks 
across regions can be exacerbated by financial frictions. Section V is the 
conclusion. 11. A MODEL OF BANKING AND THE FLOW OF FUNDS 
We now present a two-period model of regional banking.3  In each 
productive sector there are two types of individuals: depositors and bankers. 
They are denoted by their endowments, as described below. 
Information Assumptions 
The following analysis makes these assumptions about the distribution of 
information in the economy: 
1)  Bankers possess an information technology for locating and monitoring 
bank-specific investment projects; depositors do not. To locate and monitor a 
bank project, a banker uses a proportional fraction of real resources, 6. 
Thus, banks provide depositors with access to additional investment 
opportunities. 
2) Asbanker's  technology is specialized to his market and is immobile. For 
expositional simplicity we assume that monitoring costs are zero for bankers 
within a market and infinite for bankers across markets. Thus, bank technology 
cannot be used to locate and monitor projects in other markets. 
3)  Depositors cannot observe the returns of bank investment projects, although 
they can costlessly observe local bank-investment activity and the 
distribution of returns on bank-specific investments in their market. 
Assumptions  (1)  and  (3)  follow Bemanke and Gertler and explain the use of 
deposit liabilities to fund the specialized investments of banks. These 5 
assumptions imply that depositors will not accept a return that is contingent 
on bank-specific projects. Assumption  (2)  rules out short-run interregional 
bank-  capital flows. 
Production Possibilities 
In this model, there are two production technologies in a given market, 
which produce consumption goods one period later. The following assumptions 
are used in describing a market's  production possibilities: 
4) One type of investment available to all investors is a riskless project. 
The riskless investment is a constant-returns-to-scale technology, which pays 
a gross rate of return of R* on any level of resources, 1, invested in it. 
5) Bankers can use their technology to invest in a local technology with a 
random return.=  The expected return on the risky technology is a function. 
of the number of projects initiated in a given market. The risky technology 
yields the expected rate of return of R where 
(2.1)  R(1)  = y, 
where  f'>O,  fM<O,  and f(1)  is the expected gross return on an investment of 
1.  The function f(1)  is strictly concave and increasing in 1. 
6) The gross rate of return on a risky project has a lower bound of Rm, 
which is assumed to be invariant to the level of investment in this technology 
and where 
(2.2)  R* < Rf.6 
7) Banks cannot perfectly diversify portfolio risk because the scale of an 
individual bank project is large relative to the size of a bank portfolio. 6 
8)  A market's  production possibilities are independent of those in other 
markets  . 
Assumptions (I),  (3),  (6),  and  (7)  imply that an upper bound exists on  the 
quantity of an individual bank's risky investments, given its capital 
position, because the return on the share of a bank's  portfolio invested in 
risky projects is uncertain. Assumptions  (2)  and  (8)  capture the notion that 
regional banking is specialized to regional industries. They also imply that a 
bank can use its technology only to make local investments; it can only "lend" 
to banks in other markets. 
The Representative Banking Market 
Bankers receive an endowment of bank capital and possess the project 
evaluation and monitoring technology. In this short-run  analysis, the 
endowment of bank capital represents a bank's  beginning-of-period  internal 
flow of funds. Bankers live for two periods, investing their endowment in 
period zero to maximize expected profits  (which  they consume) in period one. 
To simplify the analysis we assume that there is one banker located within 
each banking sector. '  We present the prof  it  -maximization problem and the 
alternative market equilibria in a type i market.  (The  market indices will be 
omitted on local flows for simplicity.) 
In  period zero,  the bank in a type i market has the following portfolio 
balance constraint: 
(2.3)  d + $ - (1+6)1  + 1.  +  (1+6j)lj, 
where d is the quantity of deposits,  wb is the quantity of bank capital,  6 
and 6j are local and intermarket bank monitoring costs respectively, 1 and 7 
lj are the levels of investment in local and intermarket risky bank 
projects, and l* is investment in riskless.projects.  From assumption (7), 
lj"O and 6-0.  Total deposits can be disaggregated as 
where dP  and db are deposits purchased by individuals and banks in the 
local market, respectively, and db,  are deposits bought by banks from 
other markets. 
Bank profits in a type i market in period 1 are 
(2.5)  c-R(l)l+~*l*-Idd~-r~~(d~-d~~), 
where R and R* are the gross realized rates of return on risky and riskless 
projects, respectively;  rd  is the gross cost of local deposits, and rdb 
is the gross cost of deposits traded by banks in different markets.  The 
actual profits earned by bank-equity  holders are a random variable because of 
the random return on part of the bank portfolios. 
Finally, to constrain the relative yields on alternative investments in 
a way that will result in banks holding a non-trivial quantity of risky 
investments, it is assumed that 
(2.6)  R*<~'(w~), 
in all markets. This inequality constraint implies that banks will want to 
invest at least their bank capital in the risky technology. 
To attract deposits, a bank must offer a deposit rate that satisfies 
(2.7)  rd 2  R*, 
(2.8)  Rml+~*l*2fid. 8 
Constraint  (2.7)  follows from the assumption that any individual can invest in 
the risk-free technology. Constraint  (2.8)  follows from the informational 
assumptions (1).  (2),  and  (3):  it  requires bank solvency in the worst state of 
possible portfolio returns. Equations  (2.6)  and (2.8)  imply an upper bound on 
profitable but risky bank projects  . 
Bankers are risk-neutral and therefore maximize expected profits, subject 
to their portfolio constraints. Expected bank profits are 
(2.9)  E(r) = R(1)l  + R*1* -  fid. 
Thus, a bank chooses (1,  l*,d
b) in period zero to maximize  (2.9)  subject to 
(2.3),  (2.4).  (2.7),  and  (2.8).  Using equations  (2.3)  and  (2.4)  to substitute 
in the bank's  choice variables, eliminating personal deposits, the first-order 
necessary conditions for the investments of a bank are 
(2.10)  (R'(l)+W)  2 (l+B)fi, 
(2.11)  R* _>  rc'. 
The multiplier p, associated with the bank's  solvency constraint, only 
appears in the first-order condition for the risky asset. A positive value for 
this multiplier implies that a bank in a type i market is capital-constrained 
in choosing the level of risky investments. 
Conditions  (2.7)  and  (2.11)  imply that ~LR*;  depositors will receive 
the risk-free rate. Note that (2. I), (2 .lo),  and  (2.11)  imply that R(~)>R* 
also must hold or l* would dominate 1; thus, the expected return on bank 
capital is above the risk-free rate and bankers have positive expected 
profits. Depositors' Endowments 
Depositors in the economy receive their endowments in period zero and 
invest them to provide for consumption in period one. They desire to maximize 
expected future consumption. Depositors are located in a given market in 
period zero and they &posit  their endowments in local banks. Normalizing the 
number of depositors at unity, local deposits in a given market are 
(2.12)  dP-wd, 
where wd is the endowment of depositors in a type i market. 
Alternative Equilibria In Local Markets 
The local alternative market equilibria are presented when no inter-market 
trading occurs. These results will be used in describing how variability in 
local banking conditions across markets can affect aggregate investment. 
The relevant parameters that determine which allocation occurs in  any 
particular market are the debt-equity ratio of banks, the total funds invested 
in the market, and the respective distributions on the alternative investment 
opportunities. 
We assume that the relative rates of return are such that the optimal 
local investment portfolio includes some risk-free projects 
A banking market is not capital-constrained when 
The unconstrained banking allocation is 10 
where l*,  and 1  are the unconstrained level of investments in the 
risk-free and risky technologies, respectively.. The expected returns on  both 
types of projects are equated at the margin and a fraction of depositors' 
funds are invested in the risk-  free technology.  lo 
A banking market is capital-constrained  when  (2.14)  does not 
hold.  Then the share of depositors' funds invested in the risk-free 
technology must increase to guarantee depositors the risk-free return. The 
capital constraint is satisfied by 
(2.15)  RW  = (Wa-l*,) (R*-Rm)  , 
where the subscript c denotes the constrained equilibrium.  The mix of bank 
investments as determined by  (2.15)  is now: 
The expected asset yields, respectively, are 
(2.16)  R* < R(I,,)  < R(1,). 
In summarizing these alternative equilibria, a banking market can be 
capital-constrained any time the earnings on bank capital:  cannot guarantee the 
risk-free rate of return on the share of depositors' funds invested in risky 
projects. When this occurs, a larger share of depositors' funds is invested in 
risk-free projects, although the marginal expected return on a risky project 
is greater than the risk-free rate. From (2.9),  expected profits to bank 
equity-holders are lower than in the unconstrained equilibrium. However, 
because of the informational asymmetry, banks cannot attain the first-best 
equilibrium. 11 
The following sections illustrate how distributional factors can affect 
the aggregate allocation of resources even-when the first-best allocation is 
feasible in the aggregate economy. 
111. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMBALANCES AND AGGREGATE INVESTMENT 
In  this section, we show how capital imbalances across markets prevent an 
economy from undertaking potentially profitable, albeit privately monitored 
projects. This result is contrasted by first considering the implications of 
regional deposit imbalances across otherwise identical banking markets. It is 
assumed that all banking regions have identically-distributed production 
possibilities. 
Deposit Imbalances Across Banking Markets 
The aggregate quantity of deposits is assumed to be such that if banking 
markets received the average quantity of deposits,  banks would not be 
capital-constrained in  choosing their portfolio of investments; the average 
debt-equity ratio allows banks to invest in their optimal amount of risky 
projects. Consider,  then, a simple scenario where depositors are distributed 
unevenly across markets, with one half of the markets receiving a low quantity 
of deposits, *,  and the other half receivikg a high level of deposits, 
w\.  Thus, if each market received the average quantity of deposits, all 
markets would receive 
(3.1)  dp-ijd-1/2wd,+i/2wd,, 
where wdL  < w\.  The equilibrium that results from  (3.1)  will be 
referred to as the economy-wide equilibrium; in all other aspects the banking 12 
markets are assumed to be identical.  When the economy-wide equilibrium is 
characterized by (3.1),  all markets are identical;  thus 
(3.2)  d = dP = G~,  for all type i markets. 
In this scenario, the unconstrained economy-wide equilibrium satisfies the 
equilibrium described by  (2.14)  in the last section; all banks are investing 
in risky projects until their expected return equals the risk-free  rate. 
When deposits are distributed as described in  (3.1) , regional deposit 
imbalances can create yield differentials across local banking markets if 
satisfies 
(3.3)  f'(lL)=f'(wb+Wd,)>~*. 
Because on the margin, all additional deposits in deposit-rich banks  (those 
markets receiving w\)  are used to fund risk-free  projects,  aggregate 
investment in these projects is above the optimal level. If there is costless . 
inter-bank lending across markets, deposit-constrained banks will borrow to 
fund risky projects until their marginal expected yield equals the risk-free 
rate. The quantity of inter-bank deposit liabilities issued by these banks is 
(3.4)  dbL-  (1(~*) -  (wb+wdI))  < (CTd-*), 
which equals only the amount necessary to fund the optimal portfolio.ll 
The level of risky investments is equated across all markets because they all 
have sufficient capital to fund the optimal portfolio and identically- 
distributed production possibilities. 13 
Regional Imbalances In Bank Capital 
Distributional differences in the quantity of bank capital across markets 
have very different implications for market equilibrium and the aggregate 
allocation of resources. Capital imbalances can be motivated as a simple way 
to consider how past profitability can affect the short-run portfolio choices 
of banks; capital-constrained markets cannot fund projects with high expected 
returns. As in  the previous section, it will be assumed that half of the 
markets receive a low endowment of bank capital while the other half receive 
an above-average endowment. If bank capital was evenly distributed, the 
average quantity of bank capital in a market would be 
(3.5)  G~  = 1/2wbL  + l/2wbH, 
where wbI&&B.  In  all other aspects, the markets are identical. It will also 
be assumed that if all markets received the average quantity of bank capital, 
banks would not be capital-constrained  in chooking their investments in risky 
projects.  This implies that  (2.14)  holds for the economy-wide average 
quantity of  bank capital and the economy-wide market allocations would satisfy 
(2.14a) and (2.14b).  These market allocations will be referred to as the 
economy-wide equilibrium. 
In  the markets receiving the low quantity of bank capital, the capital 
constraint is binding at the expected profit-maximizing level of investment in 
the risky techno'logy. Insufficient capftal causes banks to restrict their 
risky investments below the first-best quantity. Capital-poor banks must hold 
a lower share of risky investments than in the economy-wide equilibrium. 14 
The equilibrium in capital-constrained markets in this case is 
characterized by (2.15a)  and (2.15b).  Capital-rich banks invest marginal funds 
in the risk-free technology. Unambiguously,  both markets now fund a larger 
number of risk-free projects and aggregate expected future output is lower 
than in the economy-wide equilibrium as 
(3.6)  f(~(l~)1~+~(~)l~+~*(2(~+~)-(l~++l,)))<(~(~)l,+~*((~+wd)-l~)). 
where l,-l(~*) . 
Inter-market lending will not eliminate the distortion; capital-rich 
markets will not lend to capital-poor sectors because they cannot observe 
risky project yields outside of their locality. Capital-poor banks have an 
incentive to originate local investments and sell them to capital-rich 
regions;  however, the assumption of infinite monitoring costs prohibits such 
sales. Interregional flows of bank capital will not resolve the agency problem 
because bankers in other markets cannot observe project returns outside their 
locality; bank technology is localized and immobile in the short run. Because 
securitization is not feasible, only an outright transfer to capital-poor 
bankers will resolve the regional imbalance. 
An interesting point to note is that the volume of assets that 
capital-constrained  bankers would like to originate and sell is larger than 
merely the differential in bank capital across sectors. From  (2.15)  and (3.6), 
the quantity of asset sales to capital-rich markets that would equate the 
level of risky investments across markets is This underscores the relative impact of'  capital shocks in terms of their 
effect on  aggregate output. Distributional shocks to bank capital can lead to 
a misallocation of resources across productive sectors that.is  greater than 
shocks to other sources of bank funds. This is because bank capital allows a 
bank to use its intermediation  technology. An increase in the dispersion of 
relative capital shocks across sectors of the economy will increase the volume 
of asset swaps that would occur, if they were feasible. 
IV. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES 
Regional Productiv'itv Imbalances 
The implications of differences in regional production technologies in 
this model will be illustrated by considering multiplicative regional 
productivity imbalances. We assume that one half of productive regions receive 
high and low productivity shocks to their local distributions of project 
returns, respectively,  where 
(4.1)  fi(li) =  (l+ai)f(li),  i=H,L, 
(4.2)  -9  - d. 
In  all other respects, the markets are identical. We also assume that 
(4.3)  (14)f'(wb+wd)<~*, 
so that regional risky projects can be funded locally. 16 
Unconstrained Regional Investment Activity 
A regional banking market is unconstrained if 
(4.4)  wbRrni  _>  (R"- Rrni)  (1,-wb) . 
When resources can flow optimally to alternative investment opportunities, the 
local allocations will satisfy 
(4.5)  (1-*)f*  (IL) = (l+d')f#  (IE)  = R*, 
(4.6)  1,  = l,(~*) where li(R*)  = ~(1~1-l  =(f (li)/li)-l, 
(4.7)  I* =  (wb+Wd)  -  1,  (R*) . 
Because of the concavity of f(li),  (4.5)  implies that lL<lE;  banks in 
high-productivity  markets invest more in risky projects and banks in 
low-productivity markets invest more in risk-free projects. The effect of 
regional productivity imbalances on unconstrained aggregate expected output 
depends on both the net level and the dispersion of risky'investments  in the 
economy, as a function  of the concavity of regional production 
possibilities.  l2 
Alternative Constrained Regional Banking Allocations 
We now examine how the bank capital constraint may prevent the economy 
from exploiting the productivity imbalances across sectors, thus reducing 
expected future output relative to the unconstrained allocations implied by 
(4.2)  and  (4.5) -  (4.7).  Whether regional productivity imbalances can constrain 
regional investment activity depends on the concavity and the dispersion of 
the regional production possibilities. 17 
When the productivity differential is positively related to both the 
expected returns and lower bounds of the production technologies, the capital 
constraint, 
(4.8)  wb(l~i)~m<(~'-(l+ai)~m)(li-Wb), 
implies that either type of shock may constrain regional investment. This is 
because the optimal levels of and the minimum returns on risky projects are 
positively related to the shocks. Thus, the change in the optbal  bank 
investment in risky projects relative to the change in the minimum return on 
these projects will determine which regions become constrained by productivity 
shocks as from  (4.8) , 
(4.9)  ddli  -  (R*-  (l+ai)~")~dni  P  0 where, 
ad 
For a binding capital constraint to arise in markets receiving the 
positive net shock to the distribution of returns, the risk associated with 
inflow of inter-market deposits must exceed the increase in the lower bound on 
risky project returns; thiS .is  more likely to occur if the regional production 
technologies are less concave. When regional production  possibilities are not 
very concave, productivity imbalances have a large effect on the optimal 
distribution of risky investment across regions. When.the  capital constraint 
becomes binding, bank-capital immobility implies that funds will not flow into 18 
high-productivity markets to equate the marginal expected returns. The amount 
of risky investments will be such that  (4.8)  holds with strict equality. 
When the lower bounds of the regional technologies are invariant with 
respect to the productivity imbalances, the variances of the project returns 
change correspondingly. Thus, markets receiving the positive productivity 
shocks are more likely to become constrained as the optimal level of  regional 
investment increases. When dRmi/drri  = 0, 
(4.9')  -  (R*-(~&)Rm)%~<oas 
acrlr 
Finally, mean-preserving  shifts in the dispersion of production 
possibilities across productive sectors are quite analogous to capital shocks 
in their effect on the level of bank investments in risky projects. In markets 
where there is an increase in project variance, the lower bound gn the risky 
project decreases. Given a homogeneous quantity of market bank capital,  the 
capital constraint becomes more binding in these markets  (and  vice versa). 
Banks in high-variance  markets may have to restrict their investment in risky 
projects, and all the conclusions of section IV follow qualitatively. 
V. RELATED ISSUES IN MONEY AND BANKING 
The model presented in this paper captures some of the features of banking 
in a decentralized economy. Banks originate assets that are different from 
those traded in direct credit markets, often to borrowers that cannot obtain 
funds in these markets. Thus,  banks provide intermediation services in 19 
channeling funds to alternative real investments. A second important feature 
is the informational asymmetry between banks and investors supplying external 
finance, which implies that the contractual nature of external finance is not 
irrelevant. Finally, banks specialize in lending to heterogeneous productive 
sectors, thus operating in different "banking markets." We show how the 
factors affecting the relative health of regional banking markets can affect 
the mix of real investments, independent of aggregate economic conditions. 
Our most important result is that imbalances in bank capital relative to 
existing productive opportunities have greater allocative consequences than 
imbalances in the sources of debt finance. This underscores the importance of 
banks as information producers and bank capital as their ante in risky 
investments. Relative changes in current health of specialized banking sectors 
can generate persistence in output fluctuations because they have greater 
effects on the costs of funding risky projects and the mix of current 
inves  tment  s  . 
Although asset swaps are not feasible in this stylized model, we are able 
to characterize a scenario in which banks desire to sell assets rather than 
use debt finance to fund projects. Thus, it provides a starting point for 
analyzing one possible motivation for securitization as an alternative to 
heterogeneous risk preferences or arbitrary legal restrictions. Banks will 
sell off assets rather than obtaining external finance when they can find 
buyers that have access to the intermediation  technology and will accept a 20 
return contingent upon the underlying investment opportunity. This is because 
when a bank is capital-constrained, an asset sale cannot include any claim on 
the seller's  net worth. 
For example, if we relax the assumption that intermarket monitoring costs 
are infinite, banks will engage in asset swaps if the costs are not 
prohibitive. However, two important results remain: 1)  interbank capital flows 
will not take the form of unsecured bank liabilities, and 2) finite 
intermarket monitoring costs will reduce but not eliminate yield differentials 
on bank-specific projects across markets. This illustrates that the results of 
this highly stylized model are only qualitatively affected by less extreme 
assumptions about bank monitoring technologies. 
The results obtained in this particular model will generalize to a broader 
class of models. The critical feature of debt-contracting models in general is 
that when default is possible, the amount of insider equity affects the cost 
of external finance and the volume of resources allocated across projects. 
This paper has presented some implications of specialization by financial 
intermediaries. It is not likely that these issues will disappear with 
deregulation. The potential for bank default will remain an issue as long as 
banks write contracts that are not fully contingent on the random return on 
their portfolios. Currently, we do not obsewe  banks divesting themselves of 
what can be defined as "aggregate risks." This may be due to the highly 
specialized characteristics of bank investments or because "aggregate risks" 
increasingly reflect relative changes in economic conditions across sectors. 21 
As long as banks do not write contracts contingent on  a representative 
"market portfolio," regional banking conditions have important: consequences 
for investment in an economy. Footnotes 
The private economies of scale and scope are currently somewhat obscured 
by substantial financial regulation. In the wake of the current trend 
toward deregulation, it will be interesting to see what form depository 
institutions take. One unregulated extreme is a market of homogeneous 
institutions. Each would offer the market menu of indirect claims and hold 
the optimally-diversified market portfolio of investments, including a 
homogeneous share of loans to small, risky borrowers. Given the 
heterogeneity in the real sector of our economy, this outcome would 
require very large nation-wide financial firms and no diseconomies of 
scale and scope, or the developement of secondary markets in which 
bank-generated financial claims could be traded. 
This analysis actually has implications for financial segmentation across 
types of intermediaries as well as within a particular intermediary 
industry. 
In Bernanke and Gertler (1987), banks both: 1)  initiate loans to primary 
borrowers, and 2)  conduct liquidity and risk transformation in the issue 
of indirect liabilities to depositors. Here we abstract from considering 
the maturity transformation within bank portfolios to focus on the 
regional allocation of credit. For an analysis of liquidity 
transformation, see Samolyk  (1989). 
This assumption is overly restrictive and the sensitivity of our results  . 
to it will be discussed in the conclusion. 
In terms of a bank loan asset, the upper bound of a project's  return is 
the promised yield and the lower bound is the collateral  value  (less  any 
liquidation costs.) 
It could be assumed that the lower support of the distribution is a,: 
concave function of the level of investment  (assumed  to represent the  . 
liquidation value of this technology).  This modification would complicate 
the exposition without altering the basic qualitative conclusions. 
Because the regional production technology is concave, the expected  , 
average rate of return on bank investments exceeds the risk-free rates, 
and bankers will receive any realized economic profits. The assumption of 
a monopoly bank does not affect the optimal portfolio, but simplifies the 
determination of the deposit rate. 
This does not alter any qualitative conclusions in the following analysis 
of the capital constraint. It merely implies that the bankers bear the 
cost of the constraint, as will be shown. 9.  Assumptions  (2.2)  and  (2.6)  define the respective yields on local 
investments. An alternative equilibrium could be characterized; one where 
unconstrained banks fund only risky investments with local funds. For 
brevity in exposition, we will only consider the equilibrium where 
unconstrained banks hold only both types of investments. 
10. The unconstrained banking allocation is equivalent to the full-information 
banking allocation. When ex-post bank project returns are costlessly 
observable, the quantity of bank capital is irrelevant to bank portfolio 
choice; depositors will accept contingent deposit contracts. 
11. There is no incentive to fund risk-free projects in another locality 
because the technology is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale. 
12. Expressions  (4.2)  and  (4.5-4.7)  implicitly  &fine  the economy's 
unconstrained "investment demand functions,  " l,(cr8)  and 
I*~  (d')  , for I=-L ,  H.  Differentiating  (4.4)  with respect to 
dc-d. allows us to compare the differences in li across sectors 
where 
81,  I  f'(4)  <o, 
a-d'  (LOP)  f*  '  (1,) 
a1Fl  I  -  81, 
adr 
f'(la)  > 0,  where -  + 5  > 0  as, 
(-&f"  (1,)  a$  acr8 References 
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